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1 Introduction
The days when most human beings could go through their life using exclusively their
native language are long gone. The latest wave of globalization, and The Internet in
particular, has dramatically increased individuals’exposure to multiple languages.
It has been estimated that more than one-half of the world’s population speak more
than one language (Tucker, 2001). Thus, it is not surprising that multilingualism
is attracting a great deal of attention, also among economists. Indeed, economic
research has clearly established that language skills matter for economic outcomes.
For instance, it has been shown that sharing a common language promotes inter-
national trade (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 2002; Melitz, 2008, Egger and Lassmann,
2015). Also, evidence from a variety of countries indicates that fluency in the host
country’s language has a large effect on immigrants’earnings (e.g., Bleakley and
Chin, 2004; Chiswick and Miller, 2007). Not surprisingly, these results have been
mostly attributed to the role of languages as communication devices. After all, the
ability to communicate is crucial in trade, as well as in production.
Undoubtedly, the acquisition of additional language skills is bound to facilitate
communication and reduce production and transaction costs. However, to focus
exclusively on this dimension, and characterize languages as interchangeable com-
munication codes, can easily lead to quite extreme views. Specifically, Church and
King (1993) concluded that multilingual societies should only promote the major-
ity language and hence restrict the use of minority languages to intra-community
exchanges.1 In a similar vein, Jones (2000) argued in favor of a convergence to-
wards a single world language. The central argument is analogous to the benefits of
technological compatibility. If languages are alternative, equally effi cient standards,
the social optimum requires standardization. From this perspective, the death of
languages is seen as a natural, and even desirable, phenomenon in an increasingly
globalized world. Similarly, policies that protect minority languages and promote
linguistic diversity are suspected of pandering to narrow interests, and presumed
harmful for the society as a whole.
By and large, economists have recognized that languages are much more than
neutral communication devices. A prominent example is the recent book by Gins-
1They formalized the idea that learning a second language generates network externalities; as
a result individuals underinvest in the acquisition of second languages, which opens the door to
public intervention. The optimal policy includes a subsidy on learning the majority language.
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burgh and Weber (2011). They note that preserving linguistic diversity involves
non-negligible costs. However, individuals tend to develop some kind of emotional
attachment to the language that better defines their identity; therefore, limiting
the number of languages also generates losses. Hence, policy makers should pay
attention to both the role of languages as means of communication as well as their
subjective, emotional aspects.
The relevance of the non-communicative aspects of languages can be also in-
ferred from two other strands of the economics literature. First, several studies
(including Alesina et al., 2003 and Desmet et al., 2012) use language as a proxy for
ethnicity or culture in order to examine the effects of ethnic or cultural diversity
on civil conflict and redistribution. Second, certain language characteristics have
been linked to values and economic behavior. In particular, Chen (2013) shows that
languages that grammatically associate the future and the present foster forward-
looking behavior. In a similar spirit, Gay et al. (2013), demonstrate that women
speaking languages that more pervasively mark gender distinctions are less likely
to participate in economic and political lives.2
In this paper we examine the non-communicative aspects of languages both the-
oretically and empirically. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on the
effects of acquiring a second language. In particular, we show that the acquisition of
language skills that are redundant from a communicative viewpoint can significantly
influence the pattern of social interactions, undermining endogamic behavior. We
interpret such non-communicative effects as arising from a broad notion of linguis-
tic preferences: most individuals develop an emotional attachment to their native
language and, even if fully bilingual, prefer to use it over their second language.
Clearly, linguistic preferences may also emerge from the ties between language and
culture, and reflect ethnic or political identity. In any case, it is important to note
that our theory focuses on the effect of language skills on social behavior, taking
preferences as exogenous. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the empirical results
may also depend on the nature of preferences, and hence we take this issue up again
in Section 6.
More specifically, we first provide a theoretical framework that illustrates a new
channel by which the distribution of language skills in a bilingual society affects
the pattern of social interactions. We build on standard theory and assume that
2See also Galor et al. (2016) and their list of references.
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sharing a common language enhances economic and social interactions.3 On top of
this, we assume that even fully bilingual individuals have a preference for using their
native language or the language adopted as their own in later stages.4 We model a
bilingual society with an initial asymmetric distribution of language skills: all native
speakers of the weak language are bilingual, with full command of both the strong
and the weak language, but most native speakers of the strong language are either
monolingual or only partially proficient in the weak language.5 Thus, all agents
share a common language, and hence the role of linguistic preferences can be isolated
from the communicative benefits. Cooperation (trade partnerships, marriages, etc.)
requires communication and hence the use of a particular language. Such a choice
is trivial when all partners belong to the same speech community. However, in the
case of mixed partnerships, individuals with strong linguistic preferences may reject
optimal partners (in terms of non-linguistic dimensions) and instead match with less
desirable, but linguistically homogeneous, partners. In other words, the formation
of mixed partnerships requires a satisfactory resolution of a linguistic conflict. The
crucial observation is that the intensity of the conflict varies with language skills.
In particular, as native speakers of the strong language improve their skills in the
weak language: (i) the frequency of mixed partnerships increases, (ii) the use of the
weak language also increases.
It is important to note that, if we abstract from learning costs, such an improve-
ment in language skills increases total surplus. That is, the promotion of language
skills that do not expand the ability to communicate generates social benefits, that
need to be measured against the learning costs. Thus, policies that promote minor-
ity languages can be justified not only in terms of fairness (Van Parijs, 2011) but
also, under some conditions, on effi ciency grounds. The intuition behind these ben-
efits is that the equilibrium rate of mixed partnerships is ineffi ciently low, because
individuals do not internalize the negative externalities inflicted on their potential
partners when they unilaterally decide to match with an inferior but linguistically
3See, for instance, Selten and Pool (1991), Church and King (1993), and Weber et al. (2011).
4Some kind of linguistic preferences have already been introduced in a variety of economic
frameworks. See, for example, Grin (1992), Wickström (2005), Caminal (2010), and Mèlitz (2012).
Our main focus is on how language skills and preferences affect cooperation between speech com-
munities.
5The relative strength of the two languages do not necessarily reflect the relative size of their
local speech communities. A language may be strong because of its status and prestige, or because
it is widely spoken outside the country or region (think of Russian in Latvia, or English in Quebec)
and hence incentives to learn it may surpass its local communicative benefits. See the next section
for precise definitions.
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homogeneous partner. Thus, the increase in mixed partnerships generated by the
additional language skills is bound to raise total surplus.
Next we empirically test these predictions using survey data originated in the
particular but very fitting case of Catalonia (Spain). Two main reasons make Cat-
alonia a unique test field. First, it is a bilingual society (Spanish and Catalan are
the two main languages) where the ability to communicate is not at stake because
everyone speaks the strong language (Spanish), just as in the theoretical model.
Hence, any implications of additional language skills must be attributed to linguis-
tic preferences. Second, new language-in-education policies were introduced three
decades ago, after the approval in 1983 of the Language Normalization Act (LNA).
With the implementation of this reform, education experienced a smooth transi-
tion from a system in which Catalan was excluded to one in which Catalan has
become the main language of instruction in compulsory education. This reform
led to a significant improvement of the Catalan skills of native Spanish speakers,
whereas all other language skills remained basically unchanged.6 Hence, the het-
erogeneous effect of language exposure during compulsory education allows us to
generate quasi-experimental variation in the variables of interest.
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to study the influence of improved
language skills among native speakers of the strong language (Spanish) on their
propensity to form a linguistically-mixed couple and the use of the weak language
(Catalan) with the partner.7 In order to identify the causal effect, we exploit an
Instrumental variable based on the differential effect by native language of exposure
to Catalan as a language of instruction during compulsory schooling. Compulsory
language exposure was already considered as an exogenous determinant of iden-
tity formation by Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) in a reduced-form framework.8
Here, we exploit the interaction between compulsory exposure and the indicator for
6We are referring to oral skills, which are the most relevant regarding the formation of a couple.
As discussed in Section 4, written skills in Catalan improved for both Spanish and native Catalan
speakers, although much less so for the latter group, and Spanish skills remained at very high
levels for both speech communities.
7It has been shown (Bleakly and Chin, 2010, Furtado and Theodoropoylos, 2011; and Chiswick
and Hoseworth, 2011) that the frequency of inter-ethnic marriages among US immigrants is posi-
tively affected by English-speaking ability. See also Meng and Meurs (2009) for the case of France.
Since the proficiency of individuals in the strong language varies a lot from individual to individual,
these studies cannot distinguish between linguistic preferences and communicative benefits.
8Thus, they study the effects of the same education reform, but focus on a different topic
and use a different dataset. They find that attending compulsory schooling after the LNA reform
reinforces individuals’self-identification as "Catalans". See also Aspachs et al. (2008). In Sections
5 and 6 we discuss whether identity considerations matter in interpreting our empirical results.
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being native Spanish speaker as identifying variable in a Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) setting. This exclusion restriction captures the improvement in oral fluency
in Catalan among native Spanish speakers that was induced by reform exposure
during compulsory schooling. The main underlying assumption behind the validity
of this identification strategy is that non-linguistic cohort effects are common for
both linguistic communities (in the spirit of the identification strategy originally
proposed by Bleakley Chin, 2004, 2008, 2010). Several robustness checks and fal-
sification exercises are carried out in order to validate the use of such exclusion
restriction.
Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. In particular, the 1983
education reform, by improving the oral Catalan skills of native Spanish speakers,
raised their propensity to find a Catalan speaking partner and to speak Catalan
with the partner. These results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, and
clearly indicate that linguistic preferences are relevant. In particular, the acquisi-
tion of language skills that appear redundant from a communicative viewpoint can
significantly reduce segregation.
In the next section we lay out the theoretical framework and derive two testable
hypothesis. In Section 3 we provide some historical background and describe the
data. Section 4 discusses some descriptive evidence. The main results as well as
the robustness and sensitivity tests are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
summarizes the paper and discusses alternative interpretations.
2 The theory
Consider a country with two languages, A and B. A fraction α of the population
is initially socialized in A (they are native A speakers), and a fraction 1 − α in B
(native B speakers). Everyone is fully competent in their mother tongue. These
two languages differ in their status and knowledge. In particular, all native B
speakers are also fully proficient in language A, but only some native A speakers
are proficient in language B. Because of the (domestically) universal knowledge
we call language A the strong language, and B the weak language. Perhaps, these
asymmetric language skills are induced by the fact that A is widely known in the
rest of the world and hence very useful for communicating with foreigners.9 In any
9Another reason could be that knowledge of A provides access to an abundant supply of media
outlets and leisure goods produced in that language.
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case, we take language skills as exogenous, and the identification of a language as
strong or weak as country-specific. Thus, a particular language can be weak in one
country or region and strong in another.10 In spite of the universal knowledge of the
strong language, the existence of different speech communities (defined according
to native languages) still matters because individuals develop a preference towards
their initial language, as specified below.
Individuals derive utility from forming partnerships with other compatriots (e.g.,
trade partnerships, couples).11 In particular, each individual can match a single
person. The level of utility obtained from a partnership depends on linguistic as
well as non-linguistic factors. With respect to the latter, for each agent i there is
a single best match, j, which is reciprocal (so that j’s best match is also i). The
best match generates, for each partner, a level of utility gij > 0 (pair-specific). For
simplicity, we assume that all other potential matches provide the same level of
utility, which is normalized to zero.
The activities of the partnership require communication, and hence the use of
a particular language. Everyone has a preference for using their native language.
Hence, if the two members of a best match belong to the same speech community,12
then nothing prevents the formation of the best match, since each partner obtains
gij, which is higher than any alternative. However, if they belong to different speech
communities (a mixed match), then language preferences can prevent the formation
of the best match. More specifically, let individual a be the native A speaker, and
b the native B speaker of a mixed match. If they form the partnership and choose
A as the language of communication, then a and b would obtain a payoff of gab
and gab − wb, respectively. That is, individual b incurs a cost wb for using their
second language. Individuals differ in the intensity of their linguistic preferences.
In particular, wb is the realization of a random variable w distributed over some
interval [0, w] with density function f (w) , and distribution function F (w) . We
10The universal knowledge of the strong language guarantees communication, independently of
the knowledge of the weak language. The model literally apply to cases like Catalonia, Wales
or the Basque Country. However, in other cases like Belgium or Quebec some speakers of the
weak language (Flemish and French, respectively) remain monolingual. The model can be easily
extended to take into account a fraction of monolingual speakers of B. In that case, language
skills will affect segregation not only through linguistic preferences but also through changing the
ability to communicate.
11For simplicity, we ignore potential foreign partners.
12If everyone has the same probability of being i′s best match, independently of their native
language, then the probability of a linguistically homogeneous best match is α for a native A
speaker and 1− α for a native B speaker.
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assume that f (w) > 0 for all w ∈ [0, w] and there are no mass points. If instead
they choose B, then their payoffs would be gab − ηa − wa and gab, respectively.
That is, if individual a uses B instead of A, this incurs an extra cost of wa + ηa,
where wa represents again the cost for using a’s second language (pure preference),
whereas ηa ≥ 0 represents the disutility caused by a limited proficiency in the second
language. Hence, individuals with a better command of B have lower values of η.
For simplicity, we assume that both speech communities have identical distributions
of pure preferences. That is, wa and wb are two independent realizations of the
random variable w. Whereas w is a fixed individual characteristic, η vary as a
becomes more proficient in B.13 The value of the outside option for both partners
is 0 since there is always a member of their own speech community among their
second best partners.
Given the set of values (gab, wa, ηa, wb) , the two potential members of a mixed
match must decide whether or not to form the partnership, and the language of
use in case they do. Our main qualitative results rely on the existence of some
kind of bargaining friction. For expositional convenience, we consider the following
environment. First, partners negotiate under full information about the relevant
parameters. Second, if both parties agree on forming the partnership, then they
choose the language that maximizes the joint surplus. Thus, the only friction is the
absence of monetary compensations (non-transferable utility). At the end of this
section we discuss some alternative frameworks that provide very similar insights
and qualitatively identical comparative statics and welfare results.
Hence, in our set up a will accept forming the partnership and use B only if
gab − ηa − wa ≥ 0. Similarly, b will accept using A only if gab − wb ≥ 0. These two
participation constraints imply that in equilibrium the coalition will be formed if
and only if
min {ηa + wa, wb} ≤ gab
Thus, individuals do not internalize the negative externality imposed on their
potential partners in case they unilaterally decide not to form the partnership.
Therefore, if decisions were instead taken by a social planner aiming at maximizing
total surplus (first best), then the best match would be formed if and only if
min {ηa + wa, wb} ≤ 2gab
13It would make sense to assume that a′s limited competence in B, ηa > 0, can also reduce b’s
payoff. No qualitative result would be affected by such an adjustment.
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Figure 1a depicts the equilibrium outcome (i.e., when individuals are allowed to
unilaterally reject the best match), for the case w > 2gab. The region marked with
N (no best match) corresponds to the case where one of the parties prefers not to
make the match. Regions marked with A and B correspond to the cases where the
partnership is formed and that particular language, A or B, is selected.
Figure 1b represents the socially effi cient outcome (the solution that maximizes
total surplus). Comparing the two figures, it becomes apparent that there is a
region of parameter values for which the best match is not formed in equilibrium
but should form according to the first best.14
In order to avoid uninteresting technical issues, in the rest of the exposition we





function that takes strictly positive values in this interval, and has no mass points.
Moreover, ηa and wa are assumed to be independent variables. It will be convenient
to first compare two extreme scenarios. Suppose first that η ≥ g (Scenario 0). That
is, all as are essentially monolingual. In this case, B will never be used in a mixed
match, and hence the best match will be formed if and only if wb ≤ g. Alternatively,
suppose now that all as are fully competent in B: i.e., η = 0 (Scenario 1). In this
case, the two languages are in a symmetric position, which generates a symmetric
outcome: each language is used with a fifty percent chance. Moreover, the fraction
of best matches that materialize is higher than in Scenario 0. That is: (i) if wb ≤ g,
as in Scenario 0, all best matches happen; moreover, (ii) if wb > g, then those
matches where wa ≤ g also materialize.
The comparative statics are analogous if we consider gradual, but general changes
in ηa. More specifically, for all α ∈ (0, 1), if we start from a situation where η< g
(i.e., a positive fraction of as are willing to make the best match and use B) and
there is a shift in the distribution of ηas such that the final distribution is first-order
stochastically dominated by the initial distribution, then:
Result 1 (i) the fraction of successful mixed matches increases, and (ii) B is used
more often in those matches.
See the Appendix for details.
14Instead of choosing between A and B, we could have allowed linear combinations of the two
languages, assuming, for instance, that individual utility decreases linearly with the fraction of
time in which the second language is used. The qualitative results would remain unchanged.
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Result 1 contains the main hypothesis we want to test in the empirical analysis.
That is, an exogenous improvement in the proficiency in the weak language on the
part of native speakers of the strong language reduces segregation and fosters the
use of the weak language.
We can now investigate the welfare consequences of such a change in language
skills. First, we focus again on the two extreme scenarios. If all as are monolingual
(Scenario 0), then the average payoffs to the as and bs, when their best match is
linguistically mixed, are given by:
U0a = F (g) g




Thus, the best match will materialize with probability F (g), in which case each
party obtains g. However, the bs bear all the costs of using their second language.
That is, in Scenario 0, bilinguals are worse off than monolinguals.









wbdF (wb) dF (wa)+[1− F (g)]
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Consider b’s expected utility (it is symmetric for the as). With probability F (g),
wa < g, the match is feasible and each member obtains g, which explains the first
term of the above expression. However, in this region, b incurs the cost of using
A whenever wb < wa, which is the second term. Also, wa > g with probability
1− F (g). In this case, the match is feasible only if wb < g, in which case b always
incurs the full costs of using A, which is the third term.
Note that the bs are better off in Scenario 1: U1b > U
0
b . Also, the total surplus







15 However, the as may be better off
in Scenario 0 or in 1: U1a Q U0a . The reason for this ambiguity is the following.
Compared to Scenario 0, in Scenario 1, on the one hand, a benefits from the higher
frequency of successful best matches, which increases from F (g) to F (g) [2− F (g)] .
On the other hand, they lose their power to impose their preferred language, and
15It is important to emphasize that the welfare of individuals involved in a homogeneous match
does not change across regimes. Thus, changes in total welfare are entirely driven by changes in
the welfare of individuals involved in a mixed match, Ua and Ub; and since the number of a’s and
b’s involved in a mixed match is the same, the sign of the change in total welfare is the same as
the sign of the change in Ua + Ub.
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have to bear half of the costs of using their second language.16. In other words,
even abstracting from learning costs, native A speakers may or may not benefit
from learning B. In contrast, native B speakers always benefit from this change,
since on top of the higher frequency of successful best matches, they enjoy a better
language treatment.17 Finally, the total surplus is always higher in Scenario 1.
That is, in case native A speakers lose, they lose less than the amount gained by
native B speakers. The reason is twofold. Scenario 1 generates: (i) a higher rate
of occurrence of best matches, and (ii) it allows a reduction in the total discomfort
from using the second language, since B can now be used whenever wa < wb.18
In the Appendix we show that the same comparative statics hold for gradual but
general changes in ηa. That is, for all α ∈ (0, 1) if we start from a situation where
η < g, and there is a shift in the distribution of ηas, such that the final distribution
is first-order stochastically dominated by the initial distribution, then:
Result 2 (i) Native B speakers are better off, (ii) native A speakers may be
better-off or worse-off, and (iii) aggregate welfare increases.
Thus, if we abstract from learning costs, an exogenous improvement in the
proficiency in the weak language among native speakers of the strong language raises
total welfare. However, it may also have non-trivial distributional implications.
The model presented in this section is highly stylized. In the working paper
version (Caminal and Di Paolo, 2015) we discuss various possible extensions and
interpretations. None of these additional considerations affects the main message.
In particular, one may argue that the assumption of non-transferable utility could
be highly restrictive in some applications. If we allowed for monetary compensations
then we would need to invoke informational asymmetries (on linguistic preferences,
for example). As it is well known, bargaining under asymmetric information re-
sults in excessively frequent break-ups (Myerson and Satterwaite, 1983). In such
a framework, changes in the language skills of native A speakers also reduce the
ineffi ciency associated to asymmetric information, and Results 1 and 2 still hold.19
16For example, if f (w) = 1w , then U
0
a − U1a takes a positive value if w − g is suffi ciently small,
and takes a negative value if w − 2g is also suffi ciently small.
17Notice that the third term of U1b is positive and the second term has a lower absolute value
than the second term of U0b .





wbdF (wb) dF (wa) <∫ g
0
wbdF (wb) .
19Alternatively, we could model the matching process as the result of directed (costly) search
decisions. Individuals might join a bunch of social activities in order to find their optimal partners.
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3 Empirical analysis: preliminaries
3.1 Historical background
Catalan can be regarded as the native language of Catalonia. It is a Romance
language, originating from Latin in the territory in the ninth century. Spanish
(Castilian), another Romance language, arrived in Catalonia as early as the fifteenth
century and consolidated its position among the elites during the eighteenth century.
The general population remained primarily monolingual in Catalan, and only gained
access to Spanish with the expansion of elementary education, which was relatively
slow.20
During Franco’s dictatorship (1939—1975), Catalan was restricted to the private
sphere, and nevertheless transmitted (mostly orally) from parents to children in
a large fraction of the native Catalan families. Towards the second half of this
period, efforts to revive Catalan as vehicle of culture intensified, although those
efforts systematically clashed with the legal frame and often resulted in fines, or
exile and jail sentences. In contrast, Spanish was the only offi cial language and the
only language used in education. Moreover, the social use of Spanish in Catalonia
was strongly reinforced by the massive migration from southern Spain (especially in
the 1960s). By the end of the 1970s, Catalan was the native language of almost one-
half of the population, who at the same time were fully competent in Spanish. In
contrast, most of the native Spanish speakers (40% of the population of Catalonia
had been born outside the region) were monolingual or only passively bilingual
(Woolard and Gahng, 1990; Siguan, 1991). Regarding attitudes and social prestige,
Catalan was in a somewhat awkward position. On the one hand, it was a language
excluded from public life, but at the same time the language of a large fraction of the
better educated: the middle and the upper-middle class.21 The social composition
of its native speakers is probably crucial to explain the vast political support for
"normalizing" the use of Catalan in the post-Franco era.
Right after the constitution of the Catalan regional government (the Autonomous
If different activities are conducted in different languages, then language skills and preferences
will also affect the formation of mixed partnership in a way similar to the stylized model we have
presented in the main text.
20Massive school enrollment did not take place in Spain until the twentieth century. In 1872
the percentage of the primary-school age population enrolled in school was only 42%, far below
the levels prevailing in contemporary France and England (Nohoglu Soysal and Strang, 1989).
21The economic elite and those social groups in direct contact with Franco’s regime adopted
Spanish as the unique language in their repertoire.
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Community), the regional parliament passed in 1983 (unanimously) the “Language
Normalization Act”(LNA), which set the legal framework that allowed the dramatic
changes in language-in-education policy that occurred over the next two decades.
The LNA aimed at making all pupils fully competent in both languages (Spanish
and Catalan) by the end of compulsory education. It also defined an integrative
education model, in which children were not separated on the basis of the language
spoken at home. The application of the LNA was gradual. In the period 1984—1993,
the two languages were both used as the language of instruction in proportions that
varied geographically, depending on the linguistic characteristics of the students and
teachers’language skills. Throughout this period the average fraction of subjects
taught in Catalan increased significantly over time.
As a result, at the beginning of the 1990s, Catalan had become the preferred lan-
guage of instruction in most primary schools, although Spanish was still dominant
in secondary education (Artigal, 1997). Since 1994, the authorities gave Catalan
full priority as the language of instruction in all public educational institutions, but
in practice Spanish has also been used, particularly in secondary education (Muñoz,
2005). In summary, education experienced a gradual transition from a system from
which Catalan was excluded to one in which Catalan has become the main language
of instruction, at least in compulsory education.22
Such an asymmetric treatment of the two languages has apparently produced
a fairly symmetric distribution of language skills. At the end of compulsory edu-
cation, students’levels of proficiency in Catalan and Spanish are similar (Consell
Superior d’Avaluació del Sistema Educatiu, 2013). Moreover, the level of profi-
ciency in Spanish of students coming out of Catalan schools is similar to the rest
of Spain (Instituto de Evaluación, 2011). From a dynamic perspective, the educa-
tional reform improved the oral Catalan skills of native Spanish speakers (and the
written skills of both native Catalan and native Spanish speakers), with basically
no effect on the Spanish skills of either speech community.23
The regional authorities also sought to promote the knowledge and use of Cata-
lan using a variety of means, including a Catalan-only TV channel, several cata-
lanization campaigns, and language proficiency requirements for public sector jobs.
22The education reform affected not only the language of instruction. New textbooks and in-
structional materials replaced the ones produced under the supervision of Franco’s educational
authorities, and new generations of school teachers, better educated and more proficient in Cata-
lan, joined the system. Also, specialized teachers were hired to fulfil the LNA’s objectives.
23See also Vila (2008) and references contained there.
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The results of these policies have been mixed. The use of Catalan by the overall
population has never exceeded 50%. Regarding specific environments, the use of
Catalan is preeminent in the regional and local governments and, more generally, in
the political life of the region. In contrast, its use in other branches of government
(for example, the judiciary) is close to zero. Similarly, cultural activities and media
outlets also exhibit very heterogenous linguistic patterns. For example, whereas
about 50% of the radio audiences consume programs in Catalan, less than 5% of
movies projected in Catalan theaters are either originally filmed or dubbed into
Catalan.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in the empirical analysis are drawn from the Survey of Language
Use of the Catalan Population, a representative survey that is carried out by the
Catalan Statistical Institute (IDESCAT). We use two cross-sections (waves 2008
and 2013), which originally contain 6,767 and 7,255 observations, respectively. The
database is unique, especially regarding sociolinguistic characteristics. On top of the
standard socio-demographic variables (gender, year of birth, place of birth, place of
residence, education, etc.), it reports various linguistic variables of special interest
for our analysis: the respondent’s native language (first language spoken at home
during childhood), the language of self-identification, as well as the respondent’s
proficiency (understanding, speaking, writing and reading) in both Catalan and
Spanish. All these variables are self-reported. The survey also includes several
questions about the respondent’s (current or former) spouse or partner.24 We pay
special attention to the partner’s language25 and to the relative use of Catalan (with
respect to Spanish) with the partner. Moreover, the survey also includes detailed
information about family background and parental language habits.
The restricted sample used in the baseline analysis includes individuals born in
Catalonia and those born in the rest of Spain who migrated to Catalonia at age
6 or earlier. The goal is to focus exclusively on individuals who completed their
entire schooling in Catalonia. In order to reduce possible recall bias and selective
24We do not know the legal status of their relationship (married or not), but we do know
whether or not they live together. In fact, some of our results are strengthened when we restrict
the analysis to stable couples (those who live together).
25Unfortunately, we do not know the partner’s year of birth or his/her language skills (only
native language). Hence, we need to restrict attention to the respondents’ language skills and
year of birth.
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mortality, we exclude individuals born before 1950. Respondents born after 1990
(i.e. individuals younger than 18 in 2008) and those who were students at the
time of the survey are also excluded from the analysis. Given the main research
question, it is also natural to exclude individuals who never had a partner (less than
7% of the restricted sample). Finally, in order to reduce the degree of unobserved
heterogeneity in the data, we also discard the very few remaining observations of
individuals whose native language or whose partner’s native language is neither
Spanish nor Catalan. The resulting restricted sample has 5,357 observations, 2,553
from the 2008 wave and 2,804 from the 2013 wave.
Individuals’native languages (as well as self-identification language) are clas-
sified into three categories: (1) only Catalan, (2) both Catalan and Spanish, and
(3) only Spanish. In the baseline analysis we define a native Spanish speaker if the
respondent chose option (3), only Spanish, as their native language; and a native
Catalan speaker, otherwise. According to this definition, native Spanish speakers
amount to about 45% of the restricted sample. Of course, we checked that the main
results are robust to alternative definitions.
The language proficiency variables are coded with a 0—10 scale. In our analysis
we focus on oral skills (and in particular, the ability to speak), which are much
more relevant in couple formation. Figure 2 displays the average oral proficiency
in Catalan and Spanish (and a quadratic fitted line) by year of birth, for both
native Spanish speakers and native Catalan speakers. As expected, oral Catalan
proficiency is uniformly high for native Catalan speakers (who acquired oral com-
petency during childhood within the family), whereas successive cohorts of Spanish
speakers exhibit a clear positive trend. Moreover, oral Spanish fluency is very high
and stable across cohorts for both speech communities (differences in average pro-
ficiency across speech communities for each cohort are not statistically significant).
Thus, native Catalan speakers are largely bilingual (with an full command of
both languages), whereas earlier generations of native Spanish speakers had a lim-
ited command of Catalan, and younger generations are becoming increasingly bilin-
gual. Although several factors could be responsible of the trend in oral proficiency
observed for native Spanish speakers observed in the raw data, it seems plausible
that the language-in-education reform of 1983 is one of the main reasons behind
such a positive trend. Indeed, in the identification strategy that we adopt to recover
causal estimates, we only exploit the variation in oral language skills that induced
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by the different degree of exposure of successive cohorts of native Spanish speakers
to the language-in-education reform (which is arguably an exogenous component
of the positive trend in language fluency). For the sake of comparison, Figure
3a displays written Catalan skills. Note that written proficiency improves for the
younger cohorts of both speech communities, with a more pronounced increase for
native Spanish speakers. Also, the level of written Spanish proficiency (Figure 3b)
is uniformly high and virtually identical for both speech communities.26
The partner’s language is also classified into the same three categories as the
respondent’s native language. In the baseline analysis, consistently with the def-
inition of the respondent’s native language, we define a respondent’s partner as a
Catalan speaker if either option (1) or (2), Catalan-only or Catalan and Spanish,
is reported. Language use with the partner is instead coded with an ordinal scale
(from 1 to 5): (1) only Catalan, (2) more Catalan than Spanish, (3) equal Catalan
and Spanish, (4) more Spanish than Catalan, and (5) only Spanish.27 In the empir-
ical analysis we choose a strict definition of the use of Catalan: we say a respondent
uses Catalan with the partner if option (1) has been reported: i.e., only Catalan.
Once again, various robustness checks have been conducted.
Table 1 shows that Catalan society is noticeably fragmented along linguistic
attributes. In particular, about two-thirds of native Spanish speakers have a part-
ner who speaks only Spanish. Since we have assigned intermediate cases to the
Catalan speaking community, the level of endogamy for native Catalan speakers is
even higher (about three-quarters). An important observation is that endogamy is
related to language skills. More specifically, native Spanish speakers with high oral
proficiency in Catalan (with an index greater than or equal to 8) have a significantly
lower level of endogamy (about 7 percentage points less). Similarly, the fraction of
native Spanish speakers that use only Catalan with their partner also increases by
a similar amount when we condition on high proficiency in Catalan.
26Note that this evidence clearly identifies Spanish as the strong language, as defined in the
theoretical model: that is, the language shared by all speech communities. This evidence is also
compatible with the results of the systematic tests mentioned above conducted by the national
educational authorities.
27The distribution of this variable is quite concentrated on the extreme options, (1) and (5):
only 16% of the sample report an intermediate option.
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4 Descriptive evidence: OLS estimates
We consider two different left-hand-side variables: (i) an indicator that takes the
value of 1 if individual i is matched with a Catalan-speaking partner, and zero
otherwise, and (ii) an indicator that takes the value of 1 if individual i uses only
Catalan with their partner, and zero otherwise. For each of the two outcomes, we
specify a linear probability model (OLS):
Yit = α + β
′Xi + δCati + θt + εit (1)
where the outcome Y of individual i born in year t depends on a set of controls,
X, oral proficiency in Catalan, Cat, year of birth fixed effects, θ, and a random
disturbance, ε. The coeffi cient of interest is δ. We start with a parsimonious
specification that includes as controls a dummy for wave, a gender indicator, and a
cubic polynomial of age, which picks up age differences that are not fully captured
by cohort dummies.28
We next include several controls for parental background (parents’place of birth,
education, native language) and for individual attributes (place of birth, place of
residence, and completed education). The full set of control variables is presented
in Table 2, together with basic descriptive statistics.
We start by presenting the results obtained for the subsample of native Span-
ish speakers. Selected estimates for the two outcomes are presented in Table 3
(the complete results can be found in Tables A1a and A1b in the online Appen-
dix). The estimates from the baseline specification (column a) indicate that a
marginal increase in oral proficiency in Catalan is associated with an increase by
about 4.5 percentage points in the probability of having a Catalan-speaking part-
ner. Similarly, better skills in Catalan is associated, to a similar extent, with a
higher likelihood of using only Catalan with the partner. These conditional corre-
lations are similar, but slightly lower, when we control for parental characteristics,
individual characteristics or both set of controls simultaneously (columns b, c, and
d respectively).29
28Notice that the use of two different cross-sections enables the simultaneous inclusion of age
and year of birth (since the sample contains individuals born in the same year but of different
ages), which is especially useful for the identification strategy discussed in the next section.
29We are aware of the fact that the above-mentioned controls are unlikely to represent exoge-
nous covariates. This is because some of the individual characteristics (like place of residence and
education) are choice variables, potentially related to the error term of the outcome equation(s).
Moreover, parental characteristics, as well as individual place of birth, could reflect unmeasured
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Overall, the evidence using observational data seems to be consistent with the
theoretical predictions of the model. Nevertheless, these conditional correlations
might not represent the causal mechanism portrayed by the theoretical model. First,
partner choice/language use and language skills are likely to be correlated with
common unobserved factors, opening the door to the typical omitted variable bias.
Second, language competence is self-reported, and hence measurement error bias
could also be an issue due to the systematic tendency to over-report language skills.
Third, we observe language skills only at the time of the interview, but this variable
itself is likely to be affected by the linguistic characteristics of the partner. In other
words, a native Spanish speaker is likely to improve their Catalan proficiency if
matched with a Catalan speaker. This implies that reverse causality might also
generate an additional source of inconsistency.
5 Causal evidence: Identification strategy and IV
estimates
5.1 Empirical framework
We exploit the change in the language of instruction that took place in Catalan
schools after the implementation of the “Language Normalization Act” (LNA) of
1983. Two important remarks are in order. First, oral skills in Catalan improved
only for native Spanish speakers, since Catalan was in any case orally transmitted
within Catalan-speaking families. Second, exposure to the language-in-education
reform depends on the year of birth but also on the number of years of schooling.
However, the second variable is endogenous. Therefore, in order to isolate the
exogenous component we adopt the strategy followed by Clots-Figueras and Masella
(2013), who restricted attention to exposure during compulsory education. They
constructed a variable that measures the (potential) number of years of compulsory
schooling under the linguistic regime introduced by the 1983 reform, which can be
interpreted as an “Intention to Treat”variable.30 More specifically, Clots-Figueras
parental characteristics that are potentially endogenous with respect to the two outcomes. There-
fore, the evidence regarding these control variables must be interpreted with caution and are not
discussed in details for brevity resons.
30That is, the number of years of schooling in Catalan, assuming: a) no grade repetition, b)
perfect compliance with compulsory age of school attendance, and c) uniform use of Catalan as
medium of instruction in the schools. The last assumption is the most restrictive, since in the
early years of application of the reform, the use of Catalan for general teaching purposes was
weaker in schools with a majority of native Spanish speakers. However, the focus of our analysis
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and Masella (2013) assumed that individuals born in 1977 or after received all their
compulsory schooling in Catalan, while those born between 1970 and 1976 were just
partially exposed to the reform, with one year of exposure for the former cohort,
up to seven years for the latter cohort. Individuals born before 1970 were never
affected. The length of compulsory education in Spain was eight years under the
legal framework implemented in 1974 (“Ley General de Educación”) from ages 6 to
14. A new law passed in 1990 (LOGSE) extended the number of years of compulsory
education to ten (from ages 6 to 16). This means that individuals born before 1983
were subject to eight years of compulsory schooling, and those born in 1983 or after
to ten years. 31
Thus, the variable capturing compulsory exposure to Catalan at school, cet, can
be expressed in the following way:
cet =

10, if t ≥ 1983
8, if 1977 ≤ t < 1983
t− 1969, if 1970 ≤ t < 1977
0, if t < 1970
(2)
Notice that the variation in cet is only determined by the individual’s year of
birth, which is obviously not a choice variable. Indeed, cet seems to be an appealing
way to extract an exogenous component from the positive trend in oral language
skills observed over the successive cohorts of native Spanish speakers. However,
this variable itself is unlikely to be a valid exclusion restriction to identify the
causal effect of language proficiency on outcomes. In fact, cet could capture both
the language proficiency effect of the LNA as well as other cohort effects that
potentially affect directly the outcomes of interest (i.e., partnership formation and
language use), through non-language-related channels.
In order to control for the direct (common) effects of birth cohort on the out-
comes of interest, we include native Catalan speakers in the analysis. This is in the
spirit of the identification strategy proposed by Bleakley and Chin (2004, 2008 and
2010). They estimate the (private and social) returns to English proficiency among
US immigrants, exploiting the well-established fact of the existence of a “critical
period”of language acquisition (i.e., immigrants who arrive in the host country at
is precisely the effect of the reform on native Spanish speakers (for whom the treatment was less
intense). In this sense, we are probably capturing a lower-bound effect.
31The results are unaffected by the change in the length of compulsory education, since we
obtained virtually the same results imputing eight years of exposure (instead of ten) also to
individuals born after 1982.
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a very young age assimilate the language more easily). Their identifying variable is
the interaction between age at arrival and a dummy that takes the value one if the
immigrant comes from a non-English speaking country. Under the assumption that
the non-language effects of early migration are the same for immigrants arriving
from English speaking countries as for those from non-English speaking countries,
the differential effect of age at arrival for those who migrated from a non-English
speaking country should be purged of non-language-related effects and thus would
represent a valid exclusion restriction.
In our case, we exploit the fact that oral language skills are also acquired within
the family at an early age. Hence, the language-in-education reform did not exert
any significant effect on the oral proficiency of native speakers. Moreover, the
Spanish skills of native Catalan speakers have remained very high and stable over
cohorts.
Therefore, using the pooled sample of native Spanish speakers and native Cata-
lan speakers, we use the interaction between exposure to Catalan during compulsory
schooling (cet) and the indicator that identifies native Spanish speakers as an exclu-
sion restriction, controlling for (common) cohort effects in the outcomes of interest.
The underlying assumption of this identification strategy is that both language
communities were subject to the same general cohort effects, except that we allow
the treatment (compulsory policy exposure) to affect (with increasing intensity) the
oral proficiency in Catalan of the treated cohorts of native Spanish speakers. In
other words, we assume that any specific cohort effect experienced by native Span-
ish speakers affected by the policy change should be (plausibly) attributed to better
language skills.
This identification setup can be easily represented by a two-equation system,
where the oral skills in Catalan (Cat) of individual i, born in cohort t and a native
speaker of l (l = Spanish, Catalan) is the dependent variable of the first-stage
equation, which contains as right-hand-side variables a set of controls (X), year of
birth fixed-effects (ϕt), an indicator for native Spanish speaker (l = Spanish), and
its interaction with cet (as identifying variable):
Catitl = µ+ λ
′Xi + ρI (l = Spanish) + γI (l = Spanish)× cet + ϕt + uitl (3)
The second-stage equation explains the two outcomes of interest (having a
Catalan-speaking partner and use of Catalan with the partner). Alternatively, we
could define the first outcome as having a mixed-couple and the second outcome as
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speaking the non-native language with the partner. Such a symmetric treatment
of the two speech communities seems desirable. Unfortunately, the data do not
support a symmetric approach. The problem is that the survey reports more infor-
mation about the respondent than about the partner. If the respondent is a native
Spanish speaker then we know his/her Catalan proficiency and year of birth (so
that we can impute years of exposure to the reform). However, if the respondent
is a native Catalan speaker then we ignore his/her partner’s Catalan proficiency
and year of birth. Thus, we need to define the first outcome as having a Catalan-
speaking partner and the second outcome as the use of Catalan with the partner.
The second-stage equation includes proficiency in oral Catalan as an endogenously
determined covariate:
Yitl = α + β
′Xi + πI (l = Spanish) + δIVCatitl + θt + εitl (4)
Under the validity of the identifying assumption, the 2SLS estimation of Equa-
tions (3) and (4) should provide the causal effect of oral fluency in Catalan on each
of the outcomes (δIV ) among native Spanish speakers who improved their language
proficiency due to exposure to the language in their compulsory schooling. This is
because 2SLS provides an estimate of the endogenous right-hand-side variable that
exploits only the variability of language skills that is produced by the instrument
among the subpopulation of compliers (i.e., a “local” estimate of the treatment
effect).32
5.2 Estimation results
Selected 2SLS estimates of Equations (3) and (4), estimated with the pooled sample
of Spanish and Catalan speakers33, are displayed in Table 4. Overall, the results
obtained from our identification strategy are in line with those obtained by OLS and,
more importantly, consistent with the theoretical predictions. More specifically, the
causal effect of better Catalan skills among Spanish speakers on the probability
of having a Catalan-speaking partner is just slightly higher (but not statistically
different) than the OLS estimate. Using the parsimonious set of controls, a unit
32In the empirical analysis, we cluster the standar errors on year of birth, which is the level of
variation of our instrument.
33The results obtained by applying OLS to the subsample of native Spanish speakers are virtually
identical to those obtained from the pooled sample of both Spanish and native Catalan speakers,
as shown in Table A2 in the online Appendix. This means that most of the conditional correlations
between oral proficiency in Catalan and the two outcomes are driven by the variation observed
within the Spanish speaking community.
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increase in fluency in oral Catalan increases the likelihood of a mixed match by 7.6
percentage points (versus an OLS estimate of 4.5 percentage points for the joint
sample -See Table A2). In order to gauge the magnitude of the effect, we must
note that, according to the first-stage regression, the Catalan proficiency of native
Spanish speakers fully affected by the reform is approximately one point higher
(on a 0-10 scale) than that of those not exposed to the reform (8.5 versus 7.5,
respectively). Also, the 2SLS estimates indicate that such an increase in the level
of proficiency raises the probability that a native Spanish speaker is matched with
a native Catalan speaker from 0.33 to 0.40. This is a sizable effect. The two speech
communities have a similar size, which implies that in the absence of any language-
related bias such a probability would be approximately 0.50. Hence, according to
our estimates, the reform has eliminated roughly 40% of the initial bias.
As we add parental controls, the point estimate drops slightly. However, in
contrast to the OLS strategy, including individual controls generates a modest in-
crease in the coeffi cient of interest, while controlling for both parental and individual
characteristics provides virtually the same estimate as in the baseline specification.
Regarding the second outcome (the use of Catalan with the partner), our IV
approach generates estimates that are much more similar to those obtained by OLS.
In particular, for the baseline specification (column (a)), one unit increase in fluency
in oral Catalan increases the probability of speaking only Catalan with the partner
by 5.3 percentage points, slightly above the OLS estimates of 4.3 percentage points
-See Table A2. The effect of including parental and individual covariates on the
second outcome are analogous to the first outcome case, and hence the results of
the baseline specification appear very robust. Overall, the differences between the
OLS and 2SLS estimates could be due to the fact that the latter estimator exploits
all the variation that is observed in the data, whereas the former is based only on
the variation generated by the instrument among the treated cohort of the sub-
sample of native Spanish speakers. Moreover, the presence of measurement error in
self-reported language proficiency, which could cause a downward bias in the OLS
estimate, could be an additional (and probably complementary) explanation for
this divergence. It is important to note that the first-stage estimates corresponding
to our identifying variable (the interaction between language exposure during com-
pulsory schooling and the indicator for being a native Spanish speaker), presented
in the upper panel of Table 4, have the expected sign and are strongly significant
22
(the complete results of the first-stage regressions can be found in Table A3 in the
online Appendix). Thus, native Spanish speakers affected by the language reform
did improve their oral proficiency in Catalan. The corresponding coeffi cients ob-
tained using different specifications are quite stable. Moreover, the F test for weak
identification indicates that the instrument is suffi ciently strong in all specifications.
Overall, the results obtained from the IV strategy provide empirical support for the
causal predictions of the theoretical model. Thus, better proficiency in the weak
language of native speakers of the strong language (generated by a plausibly exoge-
nous source of variation) fosters their propensity to form mixed partnerships and
use the weak language more intensively.
We have performed a battery of robustness checks about the specification of
our baseline regression. In the online appendix, we present in detail the results of
our sensitivity analysis. In particular, we show that the estimates of interest are
quite stable when we run separate estimations for males and females (Table A4),
use alternative specifications of the age polynomial (Table A5), use an alternative
specifications of the exposure variable (Table A6). Moreover, we also display the
results obtained by dropping cases of mixed languages for individuals and their
partners (i.e. Catalan and Spanish), exclude individuals who do not have a partner
at the time of the survey and focus on respondents who live with their partner
(columns (a)-(e) of Table 7A in the online Appendix).
One of the sensitivity checks is very relevant to discuss the role of individual
or group identity in explaining our baseline results. If we exclude from the sample
those respondents with a language of self-identification different from their native
language ("language switchers") then the main results remain basically unchanged.
It is important to note that the vast majority of language switchers are Spanish
native speakers who chose Catalan as their language of self-identification. As re-
ported in column (b) of Table 5, the effect of oral skills in Catalan on partnership
formation is slightly smaller, and the effect on the use of Catalan slightly higher
when we exclude switchers. Moreover, the instrument becomes much stronger and
the coeffi cients are estimated more precisely. In Section 6 we further discuss how
this exercise helps interpreting the nature of the main results. Here it seems worth
highlighting that the stability of the estimates obtained after dropping language
switchers represents a first evidence in favor of our identification strategy. In fact,
it can be argued that ethnic or political identity (Catalan or Spanish) could be
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a possible unobserved determinant of partnership formation and, as reported by
Aspachs et al. (2008) and Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013), also affected by the
reform. In other words, according to such alternative theory, some native Spanish
speakers might have adopted, as a result of exposure to the reform, a Catalan iden-
tity, and this would help them in finding a Catalan-speaking partner. However, if
identity was the main driving force behind our results, and as long as the language
of self-identification is positively correlated with ethnic or political identity (a very
plausible hypothesis), then we would expect a significant change in the main coef-
ficients when language switchers are excluded. Instead, the observed invariance of
the coeffi cients suggests that the exclusion restriction is not picking up unobserved
identity traits that affect the potential to find a Catalan-speaking partner.
On top of these sensitivity analysis, in the next section we provide more de-
tailed evidence on some key robustness checks concerning the two components of
our identifying variable (the interaction between compulsory language exposure and
the native language indicator) and the underlying identifying assumptions of our
identification strategy. First, we present the results from several placebo experi-
ments, which aim at providing evidence that our treatment variable (compulsory
exposure) is not capturing any spurious effects due to pre-existing trends across
cohorts. Second, we repeat the estimations using two alternative proxies of native
language, namely parental language and parental regional origins, in order to ensure
that our results are robust to the potential endogeneity of self-reported native lan-
guage. Third, thanks to the availability of these two proxies for native language, we
are able to (partially) relax the underlying hypothesis of our identification strategy,
requiring that the non-linguistic effects that operate across cohorts are common for
both language groups.
5.3 Falsification and identification checks
Evidence from placebo experiments. One component of the identifying vari-
able, exposure to Catalan during compulsory schooling, only depends on the year
of birth. We need to consider the possibility that compulsory exposure could cap-
ture spurious relations due to potential cohort-specific trends in (language-related)
couple formation and/or language use. We have run a set of placebo experiments,
which aim at providing evidence that our identifying variable is not contaminated
by any spurious effects.
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We consider the reduced form equation to test for falsification. Equation (5)
shows the reduced form representation of our baseline 2SLS approach,
Yitl = α + β
′Xi + πI (l = Spanish) + δRF I (l = Spanish)× cet + θt + εitl (5)
where δRF is the coeffi cient that “directly”relates exposure to Catalan during com-
pulsory schooling among native Spanish speakers with the outcomes of interest.
Then, we consider the placebo sample of never-treated individuals born between
1944 and 1969 who were schooled in Catalonia before the reform was implemented
(i.e., they were never exposed to Catalan during compulsory schooling). Therefore,
also in line with the falsification strategy adopted by Clots-Figueras and Masella
(2013), we impute years of (pseudo) exposure to Catalan at school (ce∗t ), which
are imputed “as if” the reform had been applied from 13 to 20 years before the
true reform; that is, first in 1970 instead of 1983, then in 1969 and so forth (until
1963).34 We estimate the reduced form model (5), but using the placebo sample
of individuals born in Catalonia (or migrated from the rest of Spain, before age 6)
who were never affected by the compulsory component of the reform:
Yitl = α + β
′Xi + πI (l = Spanish) + ηI (l = Spanish)× ce∗t + θt + εitl (6)
Obtaining a positive and significant coeffi cient for placebo exposure would cast
doubt on the reliability of our (real) exposure variable, because it could be reflecting
pre-existing cohort trends that apply to the outcomes of interest. However, the bat-
tery of falsification experiments we performed suggest that this is not the case. In
fact, while the reduced form estimates based on real reform exposure reflect a posi-
tive causal effect of our identifying variable on both outcomes (see the first column
of Table 6a and 6b, respectively), all the coeffi cients associated with the different
placebo exposure variables are small in size and not statistically different from zero.
Overall, this evidence suggests that the compulsory exposure variable constructed à
la Clots-Figueres and Masella (2013) is unlikely to be capturing spurious relations,
unrelated to the policy reform, as also highlighted in their original paper.
Native languages. We also address the validity of the second component of
the identifying variable: the definition of native Spanish speakers. It could be argued
34These boundaries have been chosen in order to keep a minimum number of observations in
the "pseudo" control group individuals not exposed to the fake reforms. Moreover, we are unable
to consider individuals born before 1944, since we do not dispose of exact information about year
of birth for older cohorts.
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that the self-reported native language might not be exogenous; respondents could
be influenced by endogenous factors. In particular, some Spanish speakers might
be tempted to misreport their true native language in favor of Catalan (or Spanish
and Catalan), perhaps because of the influence of the language-in-education reform
on their self-identification. In order to address these concerns, we have replaced the
native language variable used in the baseline estimations by two alternative proxies.
In particular, an individual is classified as a native Spanish speaker: (i) if both
parents have Spanish-only as native language (parental language) or, alternatively,
ii) if both parents were born outside Catalonia (parental origins). We then re-
estimated our 2SLS model using these two alternative definitions of language groups.
The results obtained for each of the two proxies of native language are presented
in column (a) of Tables 7a and 7b, respectively. These estimates are generally
similar than those obtained using the original native language variable. We only
observe a mild reduction in the coeffi cient of Catalan skills on the partner’s language
equation when individuals are classified into language groups by parental language,
and somewhat higher coeffi cients for both outcomes when the groups are formed by
parental origins.35
This evidence indicates that the main results are robust to the use of alternative
proxies of native language. Moreover, the fact that the estimates obtained using
parental origins as proxy for native language are higher than in the baseline es-
timation is consistent with the idea that the sub-population of compliers that is
captured by this new instrument are individuals affected by the reform with both
parents born outside Catalonia, who are likely to be more sensitive to exposure
to Catalan at school. In other words, native Spanish speakers with at least one
parent born in Catalonia were probably exposed to Catalan through alternative
channels, and hence were less sensitive to the reform than their counterparts with
both parents born outside Catalonia.36
The availability of two alternative proxies to define language groups opens the
possibility of analyzing the sensitivity of the results to the main identifying assump-
35Notice that using parental language as a proxy for native language creates some ambiguity in
the (few) cases in which the individual declares that both parents had both Catalan and Spanish
as their native languages. However, the results are virtually the same when these observations are
excluded (detailed results available upon request).
36Nevertheless, defining language groups on the basis of parental origins is not ideal for the
purpose of testing the predictions of the theoretical model (which is structured around the concept
of native language), since there is a relevant fraction of individuals with Catalan origins (i.e. at
least one parent born in Catalonia) who are native Spanish speakers (around 20%).
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tions in our model. First, we were able to specify two alternative overidentified 2SLS
models, in which we use exposure to Catalan interacted with both the native lan-
guage indicator and each of the two alternative proxies as exclusion restrictions.
The results obtained from the overidentified models are presented in column (b) of
Tables 7a and 7b for Spanish speaking parents and parents of non-Catalan origin,
respectively. In both cases, the point estimates of interest are very similar to those
obtained from the baseline specification. More importantly, the Hansen J test for
overidentification does not reject the null hypothesis that the exclusion restrictions
can be reasonably excluded from the outcome equation(s). This result points out
that the instrument seems to be uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of
partnership formation and language use (i.e. identity feelings, aspirations, social
networks, etc.). Second, we are also able to perform an additional (and related)
exercise. We relax the hypothesis that the only channel through which exposure
to Catalan during compulsory schooling of native Spanish speakers affects the out-
comes is through language proficiency, by including the interaction between lan-
guage exposure and each of these two proxies as a control in the outcome equations
(column (c) of Tables 7a and 7b). In this case, we obtain higher point estimates
for Catalan skills when we consider the first proxy, which also lose precision (and
strength of the instrument) due to the correlation between the exclusion restriction
and these control variables. When we instead control for parental origins interacted
with exposure to Catalan, the coeffi cient of Catalan proficiency for the partner’s
language equation is virtually identical to the baseline (but again imprecisely esti-
mated), while it becomes smaller for the language use equation. In any case, the
coeffi cients for the interaction between exposure to compulsory schooling and the
two alternative proxies for language groups is not statistically significant and very
small in size (which is consistent with the evidence from the overidentification test).
Common non-language effects. We have also tried to relax the assumption
that the direct cohort effects in the two outcomes are common to native Spanish
speakers and native Catalan speakers, which is a non-trivial underlying hypothe-
sis of our identification strategy. We allow for language-specific cohort effects by
including interactions between year of birth and indicators of the above language
group proxies. This should capture potentially heterogeneous cohort effects on each
of the two outcomes. Therefore, the 2SLS equations become
Catitl = µ+ λ
′Xi + ρI (l = Spanish) + γI (l = Spanish)× cet + ϕl∗t + uitl (7)
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Yitl = α + β
′Xi + πI (l = Spanish) + δIVCatitl + θl∗t + εit (8)
where l∗ is one of the two proxies of native language, and the terms ϕl∗t and
θl∗t represent birth-cohort fixed effects that are allowed to differ by either parental
language or parental origins. The corresponding estimates are presented in column
(d) of Tables 7a and 7b, respectively, and show the same pattern that emerged from
the models that contain the interactions between exposure and language proxy as
controls. That is, the coeffi cients for Catalan skills are somewhat higher (and impre-
cisely estimated) when parental language is considered as a proxy, while controlling
for parental origin-specific year of birth effects yields the same point estimate for
Catalan proficiency on partnership formation and a small and insignificant coeffi -
cient for the language use equation.
Subsample of native Spanish speakers. As a final exercise, we repeat the
2SLS estimation for the subsample of native Spanish speakers using the same spec-
ification as our baseline model, but using the interaction between parental origins
and exposure to Catalan as an exclusion restriction.37
We estimate the model(s) for the whole sample of native Spanish speakers and
also excluding individuals whose partner has both Catalan and Spanish as a native
language. These results are displayed in columns (a) and (b) of Table 8. They are
qualitatively similar to those obtained from the whole sample, which exploits all the
variation among Spanish speakers to identify the causal effects, while here the esti-
mates reflect the variation among Spanish speakers with non-Catalan origins who
improved their oral fluency in Catalan due to language exposure during compulsory
education. Nevertheless, the estimations are less precise and the identification is
somewhat weak, but still the results are in line with the evidence presented using
the simple OLS.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
We have presented empirical evidence and theoretical arguments that endorse the
idea that languages are much more than neutral communication devices, due to the
plausible existence of some form of emotional attachment. However, one may claim
37The heterogeneous effect of exposure to Catalan by parental language cannot be used as an
exclusion restriction, since virtually all Spanish speakers have both parents who have only Spanish
as native language.
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that our results could also be compatible with alternative, plausible interpretations.
Let us consider the following three alternatives:
Alternative 1: Results are driven by a combination of social mobility and
assortative matching.
A large fraction of native Spanish speakers either migrated from the South
of Spain the 1960’s or are their descendants. Thus, native Catalan speakers have
enjoyed in average a better socio-economic status. Some of these immigrants or their
children have climbed the social ladder, which may have raised their propensity to
match with members of these upper social groups, which in turn are more likely to
speak Catalan. Finally, native Spanish speakers may more inclined to learn and use
Catalan as they improve their socio-economic status, perhaps using the language
as a signaling device.
Some of the control variables we use in the estimation actually reflect the
socio-economic status of individuals or their families: education of the respondent,
parental education, and even the place of birth or residence of the respondent and
their families. Hence, if such alternative interpretation had a bite, the introduction
of these control variables should affect the point estimates of the effect of language
skills on both outcomes. Since this is not the case, and the main estimates are
observed to be very stable to the inclusion of various sets of controls, we find little
support for such an alternative interpretation.
Alternative 2: Results are driven by changes in ethnic or political identity.
It is well known that language is a key symbol of ethnic, national, or class
identity. For the case of Catalonia, the American antropologist Kathryne Woolard
(Woolard, 1989; Woolard and Ghang, 1990) pointed out that back in the 1980’s
ethnicity was critical to understanding language attitudes and choices. More specif-
ically, she found that Catalan was perceived by non-Catalan speakers as the lan-
guage of native Catalans and completely alien to everybody else. Moreover, the
adoption of Catalan was interpreted as sheer assimilation. In contrast, Spanish was
perceived by almost everyone as "the language of everybody", free of ethnic marks.
Thus, one may wonder if our results may simply reflect the dynamics of ethnic
politics in Catalonia. In particular, the educational reform may have affected the
frequency of mixed couples (according to our definition) not so much by changing
language skills and reducing the language conflict, but by inducing a fraction of
native Spanish speakers to cross over and become “ethnically Catalan”(that is, by
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assimilation). In other words, it could be the case that endogamy has remained
roughly unchanged, but the composition of ethnic groups has varied over time.
Our data set allows us to tentatively approach the issue of ethnic identity. In
particular, we believe that ethnic or cultural assimilation should show up in those
respondents who choose a language of self-identification different from their native
language. That is, if an "ethnically Spaniard" (a native Spanish speaker) crosses
over and becomes "ethnically Catalan", then such a switch should probably involve
adopting Catalan as the language of self-identification. In fact, in our baseline sam-
ple, whereas only about 3% of the native Catalan speakers report Spanish as their
language of self-identification, about 20% of native Spanish speakers report Catalan
as their language of self-identification. When we eliminate these “switchers”from
the sample, results remain largely unchanged (see Section 5.2 and Table 5). This
can be taken as a informal test for the role played by ethnic identity formation in
driving our results. Indeed, this suggestive evidence points out that language skills
matter beyond ethnic identity. In particular, native Spanish speakers that keep
Spanish as their language of self-identification, to the extent they improved their
Catalan skills during compulsory education, are more likely to find Catalan speaking
partners and use Catalan with their partner more often. This interpretation seems
compatible with the latest research on language attitudes in Catalonia (Woolard,
2011 and 2008; and Newman, Trenchs-Parera and Ng, 2008). These studies suggests
that the perceived link between language and ethnicity has drastically softened and
that nowadays both speech communities value bilingual proficiency.
Alternative 3: Our instrumental variable may capture spurious relations due
to potential cohort-specific trends in couple formation.
The historical period under consideration is highly non-stationary in many di-
mensions. First, it includes two antithetical political regimes (dictatorship and
democracy). Second, it has witnessed huge demographic changes; specially, the
huge migration inflows of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Third, the new information and
communication technologies, specially during the last decades, might have affected
social behavior, particularly in the marriage market. Thus, there may exist under-
lying trends in couple formation that can be captured by our instrumental variable.
The evidence from our placebo experiments reported in Section 5.2 suggests
that the compulsory exposure variable is unlikely to be capturing spurious relations,
unrelated to the policy reform.
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Summarizing, in this paper we examine the non-communicative aspects of lan-
guages both theoretically and empirically. In particular, this is the first work show-
ing that policies that promote the acquisition of language skills that appear redun-
dant from a communicative viewpoint can significantly reduce segregation along
linguistic lines. We have interpreted these results using an abstract and compre-
hensive notion of linguistic preferences, which is far more general than the presumed
link between language and ethnic identity. We are also confident that (at least part
of) the increase in the frequency of mixed couples can indeed be interpreted as a
reduction in segregation.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the case of couple formation in Catalonia.
Obviously, more research is needed before we can claim that linguistic preferences
are relevant in most bilingual societies and in other types of social interactions.
Nevertheless, we would like to comment briefly on the possible external validity of
our results. Casual observation indicates that linguistic preferences do seem to be
present in a wide range of bilingual societies.38 Thus, in this respect we believe
there is nothing special about Catalonia. However, we are much less convinced that
our results about couple formation can be extrapolated to all types of social and
economic interactions. It may well be the case that individuals (at least those who
are endowed with a suffi ciently broad language repertoire) are less concerned about
the language of use when, for example, making a transaction on the Internet than
when searching for a partner. We would not be surprised if future research finds
large variations in the relevance of linguistic preferences across different types of
social interactions.
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8 Appendix
Result 1. Note that the frequencies of A,B, and N are given, respectively, by
Pr (A) = F (ηa) +
∫ g
ηa




[1− F (wa + ηa)] dF (wa)
Pr (N) = [1− F (g)] [1− F (g − ηa)]
Hence, A and N increase and B decreases with ηa.
Result 2. The expected utilities of those individuals in potential partnerships
with ηa < g are given by
Ua = [Pr(A) + Pr(B)] g −
∫ g−ηa
0
[1− F (wa + ηa)]wadF (wa)






[1− F (wb − ηa)] dF (wb)
The effect of ηa on Ua has an ambiguous sign:
dUa
dηa
= − [1− F (g)] f (g − ηa) g +
∫ g−ηa
0
f (wa + ηa)wadF (wa)+
+ [1− F (g)] (g − ηa) f (g − ηa)




















Table 1: Partner’s Language and Language Use by Native Language 
 
 
% individuals with Catalan-speaking 
partners 




Catalan ≥ 8 unconditional 
Proficiency in 
Catalan ≥ 8 
Catalan native speakers 75.65 76.14 77.2 77.82 















































































































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Language Groups 
 
 joint sample native Catalan Speakers 
native Spanish 
speakers 
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
partner’s language = Catalan-only 0.578 0.494 0.757 0.429 0.358 0.479 
language used with the partner = Catalan-only 0.497 0.500 0.772 0.420 0.157 0.364 
Spanish native speaker (l = Spanish) 0.447 0.497 -- -- -- -- 
oral Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 8.825 2.027 9.589 0.870 7.881 2.577 
years compulsory education in Catalan (cet) 3.162 3.849 3.023 3.845 3.333 3.847 
wave 2013 0.523 0.499 0.522 0.500 0.525 0.499 
age 41.69 10.402 42.45 10.722 40.76 9.915 
male 0.487 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.473 0.499 
father place of birth = Barcelona 0.030 0.171 0.016 0.125 0.048 0.214 
Girona 0.220 0.414 0.287 0.452 0.138 0.345 
Tarragona 0.064 0.244 0.110 0.313 0.006 0.079 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.041 0.198 0.066 0.247 0.010 0.100 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.056 0.230 0.095 0.293 0.008 0.086 
Central Catalonia 0.071 0.257 0.120 0.324 0.011 0.104 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.056 0.230 0.093 0.290 0.010 0.102 
Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.035 0.185 0.061 0.239 0.004 0.061 
Basque Country and Galicia 0.009 0.092 0.008 0.090 0.009 0.095 
other Spanish regions 0.018 0.131 0.006 0.080 0.031 0.174 
other places 0.389 0.487 0.129 0.336 0.709 0.454 
miss father's place of birth 0.012 0.110 0.009 0.097 0.016 0.125 
mother place of birth = Barcelona 0.007 0.086 0.008 0.090 0.007 0.081 
Girona 0.234 0.423 0.305 0.460 0.146 0.353 
Tarragona 0.066 0.249 0.112 0.316 0.010 0.100 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.044 0.205 0.071 0.257 0.010 0.100 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.058 0.234 0.100 0.300 0.006 0.076 
Central Catalonia 0.068 0.251 0.113 0.316 0.012 0.109 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.058 0.235 0.095 0.293 0.013 0.115 
Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.033 0.179 0.057 0.231 0.004 0.064 
Basque Country and Galicia 0.019 0.136 0.019 0.135 0.019 0.137 
other Spanish regions 0.017 0.129 0.007 0.082 0.029 0.168 
other places 0.388 0.487 0.108 0.310 0.735 0.441 
miss father's place of birth 0.007 0.084 0.006 0.080 0.008 0.089 
Parents’ native language = both Spanish 0.435 0.496 0.067 0.249 0.890 0.313 
Catalan native language of father or mother 0.157 0.364 0.207 0.405 0.095 0.293 
Catalan native language of father and mother 0.408 0.492 0.726 0.446 0.015 0.122 
missing parents' native language 0.004 0.067 0.003 0.055 0.006 0.079 
highest parental education = no education 0.029 0.168 0.027 0.162 0.031 0.174 
primary 0.185 0.388 0.122 0.328 0.263 0.440 
secondary 0.495 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.489 0.500 
tertiary 0.201 0.401 0.238 0.426 0.155 0.362 
missing parental education 0.090 0.286 0.113 0.316 0.062 0.242 









Table 2 (continued): Descriptive Statistics by Language Groups 
 
 joint sample native Catalan Speakers 
native Spanish 
speakers 
 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
individual's place of birth = Barcelona 0.503 0.500 0.402 0.490 0.628 0.484 
Girona 0.085 0.279 0.113 0.317 0.050 0.218 
Tarragona 0.065 0.246 0.070 0.256 0.058 0.233 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.065 0.246 0.108 0.311 0.011 0.104 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.097 0.296 0.129 0.336 0.056 0.231 
Central Catalonia 0.082 0.274 0.104 0.305 0.054 0.226 
Pyrenees and Aran Valley 0.041 0.199 0.065 0.247 0.012 0.109 
Balearic Islands and Valencia 0.003 0.056 0.001 0.037 0.005 0.073 
Basque Country and Galicia 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.071 
other Spanish regions 0.057 0.232 0.005 0.073 0.121 0.326 
individual's place of residence = Barcelona city 0.145 0.353 0.120 0.325 0.177 0.381 
Barcelona's metropolitan area 0.314 0.464 0.205 0.404 0.449 0.497 
Girona 0.109 0.312 0.138 0.345 0.073 0.261 
Tarragona 0.078 0.269 0.079 0.269 0.078 0.268 
Southern Catalonia (Terres de l'Ebre) 0.071 0.257 0.114 0.318 0.018 0.131 
Western Catalonia (Ponent) 0.126 0.332 0.140 0.347 0.110 0.313 
Central Catalonia 0.091 0.287 0.107 0.309 0.071 0.256 
Pyrenees 0.065 0.246 0.097 0.296 0.025 0.158 
completed education = primary or less 0.254 0.435 0.216 0.412 0.300 0.458 
secondary 0.458 0.498 0.439 0.496 0.481 0.500 
tertiary 0.267 0.443 0.323 0.468 0.199 0.399 
other education levels 0.021 0.143 0.022 0.145 0.020 0.140 
































Table 3: Linear Probability Model Estimates (selected results)  
— Subsample of Native Spanish Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.044a 0.040a 0.036a 0.035a 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
OLS ― Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.040a 0.037a 0.029a 0.027a 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Parents’ controls NO YES NO YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES 
Number of observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for 
year of birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth 
dummies. Regressions in column (b) contain controls for paternal and maternal place of birth 
(with missing indicators), dummies for Catalan as parental native language and highest 
parental education (with missing indicators). Regressions in column (c) include controls for 
individual’s place of birth, place of residence and completed education (with missing 






































Table 4: 2SLS Estimates (selected results) 
— Joint Sample of Spanish and Catalan Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) -2.105a -1.556a -1.643a -1.376a 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.085) (0.097)    
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a 0.115a 0.105a 0.104a 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)    
F-test of excluded instruments 46.84 48.29 52.73 46.14 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000]	 [0.000]	 [0.000]	
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.068a 0.077a 0.073a 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)    
I(l = Spanish) -0.261a -0.132a -0.195a -0.109a 
 (0.043) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028)    
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053b 0.035c 0.057c 0.043c  
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)    
I(l = Spanish) -0.517a -0.269a -0.416a -0.234a 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)    
Parents’ controls NO YES NO YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES 
Number of observations 5,357	 5,357	 5,357	 5,357	
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for 
year of birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth 
dummies. Regressions in column (a) represent our baseline results. Regressions in column (b) 
contain controls for paternal and maternal place of birth (with missing indicators), dummies 
for Catalan as parental native language and highest parental education (with missing 
indicators). Regressions in column (c) include controls for individual’s place of birth, place of 
residence and completed education (with missing indicators). The F-test on excluded 
instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years 
of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator for Spanish as native 
























Table 5: Sensitivity to Language Switchers 
 
 (a) (b) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a 0.199a 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.338 
F-test of excluded instruments  46.84 94.84 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.063a 
 (0.024) (0.012) 
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.282 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used with the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053b 0.055a 
 (0.021) (0.012) 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.532 
Number of observations 5,357 4,276 
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for 
year of birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an indicator for 
being native Spanish speaker and year of birth dummies. The F-test on excluded instruments 
refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure 
to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator for Spanish as native language. 
Regressions in column (a) represent our baseline results. In column (b) we repeat the 
estimations excluding individuals who switch from Spanish (native language) to Catalan 






























Table 6a: Falsification Analysis (Baseline and Placebo Reduced Form Equations) 
 
Dependent Variable: Partner’s 
Language = Catalan-Only 
Real Reform of: Placebo reform in 
1983 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 
I(l = Spanish) -0.420a -0.446a -0.443a -0.440a -0.435a -0.430a -0.427a -0.428a -0.430a 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.009a         
 (0.003)         
I(l = Spanish) × cet*  0.005        
  (0.004)        
I(l = Spanish) × cet*   0.004       
   (0.004)       
I(l = Spanish) × cet*    0.003      
    (0.004)      
I(l = Spanish) × cet*     0.002     
     (0.004)     
I(l = Spanish) × cet*      0.001    
      (0.004)    
I(l = Spanish) × cet*       0.000   
       (0.005)   
I(l = Spanish) × cet*        0.000  
        (0.005)  
I(l = Spanish) × cet*         0.001 
          (0.005) 
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210 
Number of observations 5357 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c 
significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an indicator for being native Spanish speaker and year 
of birth dummies. The regression in the first column is reduced form equation for the baseline sample. Regressions in columns 2-9 are based on a subsample 
of never-treated individuals (born between 1944 and 1969, in Catalonia or migrated before age 6); placebo compulsory exposure (cet*) is imputed “as 











Table 6b: Falsification Analysis (Baseline and Placebo Reduced Form Equations) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Language Used With the 
Partner = Catalan-Only 
Real Reform of 
1983 
Placebo reform in: 
1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 
I(l = Spanish) -0.628a -0.615a -0.612a -0.607a -0.603a -0.598a -0.593a -0.589a -0.583a 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.006b         
 (0.003)         
I(l = Spanish) × cet*  -0.001        
  (0.003)        
I(l = Spanish) × cet*   -0.002       
   (0.003)       
I(l = Spanish) × cet*    -0.003      
    (0.003)      
I(l = Spanish) × cet*     -0.003     
     (0.004)     
I(l = Spanish) × cet*      -0.004    
      (0.004)    
I(l = Spanish) × cet*       -0.005   
       (0.004)   
I(l = Spanish) × cet*        -0.005  
        (0.004)  
I(l = Spanish) × cet*         -0.006 
          (0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.397 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.398 
Number of observations 5357 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 
Note: OLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of birth. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c 
significant at 10%. All regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial, an indicator for being native Spanish speaker and year 
of birth dummies. The regression in the first column is reduced form equation for the baseline sample. Regressions in columns 2-9 are based on a subsample 
of never-treated individuals (born between 1944 and 1969, in Catalonia or migrated before age 6); placebo compulsory exposure (cet*) is imputed “as if” 




 Table 7a: Sensitivity to Alternative Language Definitions and Identifying Assumptions 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) (d) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a  0.075a 0.075a 0.074a 
 (0.017)  (0.017)    (0.017)    (0.016)    
I(l*= parents Spanish speakers) × cet  0.114a 0.048b  0.048b   
  (0.018) (0.019)    (0.019)     
φl*,t     YES 
F-test of excluded instruments  46.84 38.88 22.67 19.86 20.19 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.056a 0.063a 0.138b 0.142c 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)    (0.070) (0.074) 
I(l*= parents Spanish speakers) × cet    -0.010  
    (0.008)  
θl*,t     YES 
Hansen J test for overidentification    1.526   
[p-value]   [0.211]   
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053b 0.055a 0.050b 0.094 0.093 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.021)    (0.061) (0.064) 
I(l*= parents Spanish speakers) × cet    -0.006  
    (0.007)  
θl*,t     YES 
Hansen J test for overidentification   0.718   
[p-value]   [0.397]   
Number of observations 5,357  5,193    5,193    5,193    5,193    
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of 
birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All regressions include 
dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth dummies. The baseline 
regression and models in columns (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for being native Spanish 
speaker; models in columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for individuals whose parents 
are both Spanish-only speakers. Regressions in column (d) include interactions between year of birth 
dummies and the indicator for individuals whose parents are Spanish-only speakers. The F-test on 
excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years 
of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling and the indicator for Spanish as native language and the 

























Table 7b: Sensitivity to Alternative Language Definitions and Identifying Assumptions 
 
 baseline (a) (b) (c) (d) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l = Spanish) × cet 0.115a  0.067a 0.067a 0.065a 
 (0.017)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
I(l*= non-Catalan origins) × cet  0.131a 0.071a 0.071a  
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)  
φl*,t      YES 
F-test of excluded instruments  46.84 48.38 24.73 10.35 9.69 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.003] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076a 0.085a 0.070a 0.081 0.081 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.055) (0.059) 
I(l*= non-Catalan origins) × cet    -0.002  
    (0.008)  
θl*,t     YES 
Hansen J test for overidentification    0.025   
[p-value]   [0.875]   
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.053b 0.089a 0.051a 0.014 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.052) (0.054) 
I(l*= non-Catalan origins) × cet    0.005  
    (0.007)  
θl*,t     YES 
Hansen J test for overidentification   0.715   
[p-value]   [0.398]   
Number of observations 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 5,357 
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for year of 
birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All regressions include 
dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth dummies. The baseline 
regression and models in columns (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for being native Spanish 
speaker; models in columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) also contain an indicator for individuals with non-Catalan 
origins. Regressions in column (d) include interactions between year of birth dummies and the indicator 
for individuals with non-Catalan origins. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the Angrist-Pischke 
multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan at compulsory schooling 






















Table 8: 2SLS Estimates (Selected Results) — Subsample of Spanish Speakers 
 
 (a) (b) 
FIRST STAGE — Dependent Variable: Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 
I(l* = non-Catalan origins) -0.790a -0.756a 
 (0.212) (0.228) 
I(l* = non-Catalan origins) × cet 0.096a 0.097a 
 (0.023) (0.031) 
F-test of excluded instruments 9.83 9.42 
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Partner’s Language = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.047 0.097c 
 (0.051) (0.050) 
I(l* = non-Catalan origins) -0.024 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.028) 
2SLS — Dependent Variable: Language Used With the Partner = Catalan-Only 
Proficiency in Catalan (Cat) 0.076c 0.079c 
 (0.043) (0.047) 
I(l* = non-Catalan origins) -0.025 -0.034 
 (0.022) (0.024) 
Number of observations 2,396	 2,396	
Note: 2SLS regression estimates with standard errors (within parenthesis in italic) adjusted for 
year of birth clusters. a Significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. All 
regressions include dummies for wave and gender, a cubic age polynomial and year of birth 
dummies. Regressions in column (b) exclude observations of individuals whose partner has 
both Catalan and Spanish as native language. The F-test on excluded instruments refers to the 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test on the interactions between years of exposure to Catalan 
at compulsory schooling and the indicator for having non-Catalan origins. 
 
